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THE PARALLEL WORLDS OF GUEST WORK AND GIG WORK 
LETICIA M. SAUCEDO* 
Work is stratified both in the brick-and-mortar world and in the gig 
economy. While this observation may seem trite, it demands attention because 
it may provide clues as to how methods of recruiting, hiring and maintaining a 
workforce that are embedded in discriminatory practices carry over to the 
independent contractor arrangements in gig work. In this Article, I compare the 
evolution of working conditions in guest work to the conditions of workers in 
the gig—also known as the platform—economy. Understanding the 
commonalities is a first step to building bridges between workers in the brick 
and mortar world and the gig world. Importantly, the demographics show that 
immigrants are the foundation of independent contracting in both worlds.  
For purposes of this Article, I define gig work as all forms of independent 
contracting in which work is contracted on a temporary basis, whether monthly, 
weekly, daily, or even hourly or by the minute. The temporariness of the work 
is part of what makes the work precarious and the workers vulnerable.1 These 
workers are excluded from the protections of labor and employment laws, as 
well as from the social benefit programs structured around employment, 
including health insurance, pensions, unemployment insurances and workers’ 
compensation.2 This definition also captures workers in both the brick-and-
mortar economy and in the gig economy. This is important because I want to 
focus on the ways in which employer attitudes toward vulnerable workers in the 
former affect the treatment of workers in the latter. This is also important 
because gig work has grown in importance in the public imagination, if not in 
actual numbers.3 In the end, we are talking about the same workers, who straddle 
the physical and virtual work worlds, even as the economy shifts.  
 
* Professor of Law, U.C. Davis School of Law. For their ideas, thoughts, comments and 
encouragement I thank Jay Mootz, Luz Herrera, Mae Quinn, Kati Griffith, Shannon Gleeson, 
Miriam Cherry, Matt Bodie, and the participants of the St. Louis University School of Law’s 
Symposium on Law, Technology and the Organization of Work. This Article was written with 
funding support from the Martin L. King Research Scholar program at U.C. Davis School of Law. 
 1. Arne L. Kalleberg, Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations in 
Transition, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 1 (2009); Miriam Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital 
Transformation of Work, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 578 (2016). 
 2. Id. at 581, 598. 
 3. See Annette Bernhardt & Sarah Thompson, What Do We Know About Gig Work in 
California? An Analysis of Independent Contracting, U.C. BERKELEY LAB. CTR. (June 14, 2017), 
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I.  DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE GIG AND BRICK AND MORTAR WORLDS 
A recent California-based study noted the diversity of independent 
contractors, both in the brick and mortar and gig world:  
[T]he demographics of the independent contractor workforce differ markedly 
across the occupational spectrum. We find that women, immigrants, and Latinos 
are disproportionately employed in what are typically lowwage [sic] 
occupations, while White independent contractors are disproportionately 
employed in what are typically higher-wage occupations. Clearly, more research 
is needed to understand the variation in independent contractor work in 
California, with a particular focus on identifying those occupations at risk of 
economic insecurity and especially misclassification.4 
Platform gig workers tend to be lower income, male and younger.5 A recent 
Pew Research Center study found that participation in the platform economy is 
more common among Blacks and Latinos.6 About half of independent 
contractors are workers of color, and they are more likely to be foreign-born.7 
This trend has actually been increasing over the past three decades.8  
Self-employment, or small business employment, has become a viable 
livelihood among Latino immigrants. In fact, business ownership is higher 
among the foreign-born than the native born in the United States.9 Mexicans 
comprise the largest group of immigrants who start businesses or are self-
employed in the United States, amounting to nearly a quarter of all immigrant 
businesses.10 More than half of these businesses are run by immigrants having a 
high school degree or less, indicating that these businesses likely exist in 
construction, agriculture, service and other low-skill sectors.11 The majority of 
immigrant businesses are unincorporated.12 
In fact, immigrants are driving entrepreneurship in states that encourage 




 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Aaron Smith, Gig Work, Online Selling and Home Sharing, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 
17, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/17/gig-work-online-selling-and-home-sharing/ 
[https://perma.cc/4J2N-5GMG]. 
 7. See Bernhardt & Thompson, supra note 3. 
 8. MAGNUS LOFSTROM, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., ENTREPRENEURSHIP AMONG 
CALIFORNIA’S LOW-SKILLED WORKERS 6, 10 (Apr. 2010), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/re 
port/R_410MLR.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJN5-EQPD]. 
 9. Robert W. Fairlie & Magnus Lofstrom, Immigration and Entrepreneurship 11 (Inst. for 
the Stud. of Lab., Discussion Paper No. 7669, 2013), http://ftp.iza.org/dp7669.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/77J4-6RV6]. 
 10. Id. at 12. 
 11. Id. at 14, 16. 
 12. Id. at 17. 
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Americans in California concluded that immigrants in the state are 
overrepresented in self-employment and small business.13 A separate study 
found that immigrants were almost twice as likely to start new businesses as the 
native-born population.14 Immigrants are overrepresented as entrepreneurs in 
California, where they comprise thirty-eight percent of all entrepreneurs in the 
state but only twenty-seven percent of the population.15 Immigrants started 
almost forty-five percent of new California businesses during the Great 
Recession, between 2007 and 2011.16 Immigrants contributed to the California 
economy as entrepreneurs, small business persons, and self-employed 
individuals both at the high and the low end of the skills spectrum. At the low 
end, an estimated sixty percent of landscapers, seventy-two percent of 
agricultural workers, seventy-six percent of garment workers, and sixty-four 
percent of domestic workers are immigrants.17 Immigrants tend to take the most 
labor-intensive jobs in the economy, and they are overrepresented in those jobs. 
Over ninety percent of sewing machine operators in California are immigrants, 
for example.18 At the high end of the skill spectrum, 56.5% of software 
developers in California are immigrants.19 Also at the high end of the skill 
spectrum are company owners, including Elon Musk, founder of Tesla, and 
Steven Chen and Jawed Karim, founders of YouTube.20 
Importantly, immigrants perceive greater freedom in small business or self-
employment opportunities because of the requirements for employment 
authorization that exist in the wage market. Studies show that “increased 
enforcement of employer sanctions against the hiring of unauthorized 
immigrants in wage/salary employment may lead to higher self-employment 
 
 13. NEW AMERICAN ECONOMY, THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF NEW AMERICANS IN CALIFORNIA 
2 (2016), http://research.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-ca-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6MQA-TR6C]. 
 14. Fairlie & Lofstrom, supra note 9, at 7. 
 15. NEW AMERICAN ECONOMY, supra note 13, at 2. 
 16. Id. at 2–3 
 17. Id. at 7. 
 18. Id. at 8. 
 19. Id. 
 20. NEW AMERICAN ECONOMY, supra note 13, at 3; James Conca, Elon Musk—An African 
Immigrant Changes the World, FORBES (Jun. 19, 2014, 4:44 PM), https://www.forbes. 
com/sites/jamesconca/2014/06/19/elon-musk-an-african-immigrant-changes-the-world/#5f16d84 
33460 [https://perma.cc/M3LM-HTSQ]; John Cloud, How a Couple of Regular Guys Built a 
Company that Changed the Way We See Ourselves, TIME (Dec. 25, 2006), http://content.time.com 
/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1570795-6,00.html [https://perma.cc/ZT69-4SKJ]; Jim Hopkins, 
Surprise! There’s a Third YouTube Co-Founder, USA TODAY (Oct. 11, 2006, 10:41 PM), http://usa 
today30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-10-11-youtube-karim_x.htm [https://perma.cc/BKM9-XA 
95]. 
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rates.”21 Independent contract work and self-employment have, therefore, 
become default strategies for avoiding unauthorized employment, which runs 
afoul of immigration law.22 If independent contractors are not employees, the 
thinking goes, they are not subject to rules for hiring or employing 
undocumented workers.23 This thinking converges with that of employers who 
seek to avoid the regulation of employment laws that apply to the employment 
relationship, but not to the contractor relationship.24 Identifying as an 
independent contractor, for example, allows an undocumented worker to provide 
goods and services without being “knowingly hired” as an unauthorized alien 
and without having to verify employment authorization through the federal 
government’s verification system.25  
An Uber driver who has immigration constraints might choose independent 
contractor status for its perceived freedom. Yet, this freedom is different from 
what we typically think about in the gig economy. In the dominant narrative, 
freedom is couched in terms of “freedom to:” to have flexibility in work hours, 
to arrange work around family or other obligations, to set the terms and 
conditions of one’s own employment, or to be one’s own boss. In the immigrant 
worker context, it’s “freedom from:” from regulation outside the workplace that 
affects one’s work status; from immigration enforcement in the workplace; and 
from rules in the contract labor realm that limit wages, restrict conditions, and 
restrict mobility.26 Exploring the forms of employment arrangements allows us 
to think about how best to protect precarious workers as new economic 
arrangements emerge.  
The gig economy takes its lead from how employers structured relationships 
in the brick and mortar economy—especially after the Great Recession—to 
incentivize independent contract or self-employment.27 This is why the statistics 
concerning immigrants and their overrepresentation in self-employment are so 
revealing. They exemplify the ways in which employers take advantage of 
vulnerability that stems from factors such immigration status, race, gender, or 
socioeconomic status. For every Elon Musk at the high end of the skill spectrum, 
there are thousands of immigrants at the low end, working through labor 
 
 21. NEW AMERICAN ECONOMY, supra note 13, at 26 (citing Sarah Bohn & Magnus Lofstrom, 
Employment Effects of State Legislation, in IMMIGRATION, POVERTY, AND SOCIOECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY 298–302 (David Card & Steven Raphael eds., 2013)). 
 22. Bohn and Lofstrom, supra note 21 at 287. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. Id. at 284–85, 287. 
 26. Cindy Carcamo, Immigrants Lacking Papers Work Legally – as Their Own Bosses, L.A. 
TIMES (Sept. 14, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/14/nation/la-na-ff-immigration-busi 
ness-20130915 [https://perma.cc/K6K4-BAJW]. 
 27. Steven Hill, Raw Deal: How the “Uber Economy” and Runaway Capitalism Are Screwing 
American Workers 4–5 (2015). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2018] THE PARALLEL WORLDS OF GUEST WORK AND GIG WORK 123 
contractors, third-party contractors, or subcontractors in industries that are 
thriving on their labor.28  
The concentration of Latinos and immigrants among low-wage independent 
contractors is important because such a system is characteristic of low-quality 
workplace conditions—often including the misclassification of employees as 
independent contractors. Researchers note that, “[i]n low-wage occupations in 
particular, workers such as janitors employed by subcontractors may be forced 
to accept independent contractor status, even though they are clearly 
employees.”29 
Many of the forms of social control that developed in the brick and mortar 
economy exist for gig workers, albeit in more sophisticated and nuanced 
versions. Looking to the treatment of workers in immigrant workplaces has 
important consequences for predicting the areas of dispute for gig workers in 
general. The next section of this Article describes the ways in which legislative 
efforts to control temporary workers signal forms of control beyond those 
available in traditional employment.  
II.  THE VULNERABILITY OF IMMIGRANT WORKERS AND WHAT IT SIGNALS FOR 
GIG WORKERS 
While immigrants are vulnerable in different ways, I focus here on the 
vulnerabilities that are perpetuated in the low-skill guest worker program in the 
United States. The most obvious vulnerability is guest workers’ temporary stay 
in the United States, which is entirely dependent on continued work with an 
employer sponsor.  
A. Guest Work and the AG Act of 2017 
Under current immigration law, employers can hire temporary unskilled 
foreign labor—guest workers—for jobs that are seasonal, short-term, and to fill 
a temporary need of a company.30 Examples of unskilled occupations eligible 
for guest work include forestry, landscaping, housekeepers, amusement and 
recreation attendants, service workers, poultry and meat processing workers, and 
construction laborers.31 Guest workers start from a position of vulnerability 
because of parameters imposed by immigration law. In order to seek the services 
of a guest worker under the immigration statute, the employer must certify that 
 
 28. See NEW AMERICAN ECONOMY, supra note 13, at 6. 
 29. Bernhardt & Thompson, supra note 3. 
 30. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(B) 
(2012). 
 31. H-2B Temporary Non-Agricultural Labor Certification Program – Selected Statistics, FY 
2014 YTD, OFFICE OF FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION (2014), https://www.foreignlaborcert. 
doleta.gov/pdf/H-2B_Selected_Statistics_FY_2013_YTD_Q4_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S9K-5 
DG2]. 
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there are no qualified, willing, and available U.S. workers for the job and that 
the employment of a guest worker will not affect wages and working conditions 
in the local market.32 The guest worker is therefore confined under immigration 
law to only a small subset of jobs for which these conditions are met. The 
Department of Labor must certify that the employer is offering wages and 
working conditions that would not discourage American workers from applying, 
which means offering a wage equal to the prevailing wage.33 Second, the guest 
worker can only work for a temporary fixed period of time, currently less than 
one year.34 After that, the guest worker must return to her home country.35 Most 
importantly, the guest worker cannot move freely or easily from job to job if she 
is dissatisfied with her employment relationship.36 The freedom to exit is 
circumscribed by provisions of the law that makes the guest worker deportable 
if she leaves the employment relationship.37 These factors make the guest 
worker much more dependent on the employer—and therefore vulnerable—than 
the prototypical employee. 
Limitations on the employment rights of guest workers as demonstrate the 
leverage employers have in industries that dominate the guest worker program. 
The limitations, are, of course, not natural or endemic to the jobs or the industries 
involved. We can see just how these limitations evolve by reviewing the ways 
in which employers continue to seek restrictions on employee protections for 
guest workers. Here is where things get worse, and at the same time demonstrate 
how much power employers have over employees who are vulnerable in one 
way or another.  
The Agricultural Guestworker Act of 2017 (the “AG Act”) is a little-known 
bill that promises to introduce new and even more restrictive forms of control 
over guest workers.38 I review it here because I want to demonstrate the aspects 
of work that employers seek to control. The AG Act proposes to expand the 
current guest worker program into industries outside of the traditional 
agricultural and low-skill work.39  
The AG Act would authorize a dramatic expansion of the current guest 
worker, or H-2 program, by creating a new category of visas for agricultural and 
 
 32. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(5)(A)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i) (2012). 
 33. 20 C.F.R. § 655.10(a) (2015). 
 34. 20 C.F.R. § 655.6 (2015); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(ii)(B) (2018). 
 35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (2012). 
 36. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(D) (2018). 
 37. An employer must notify the immigration agency if an H-2B employee abandons 
employment. Because the visa is contingent on employment, the H-2B employee will be considered 
out of compliance with her visa and deportable. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(i)(B); Immigration and 
Nationality Act § 237(a)(1)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (2012). 
 38. AG Act, H.R. 4092, 115th Cong. (introduced October 23, 2017). 
 39. Compare H.R. 4092 § 2 (listing specific activities within the definition of “agricultural 
labor or services” including forestry and aquaculture) with 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(15)(H) (2018) 
(having no specific definition for “agricultural labor or services”). 
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food industry workers. Up to 450,000 visas would be available under a new H-
2C guest worker program.40 By contrast, the current H-2A program accounted 
for approximately 165,000 visas in 2016.41 This visa program is envisioned as 
the major source of labor for the food industry.42 If employers were to reach the 
450,000-visa cap, the proposed legislation would allow employers to seek 
additional visas to ensure that employers are not vulnerable to labor shortages.43 
By locking in such a labor supply, employers shield themselves from possible 
organizing efforts. They can also ensure workplace control over a broader 
segment of their workers.  
The AG Act will also affect existing labor efforts within the food industry. 
The AG Act would authorize an expansion in the categories of jobs to include 
aquaculture operations, dairies, raw (including meat and poultry) food 
processors, and forestry-related industries.44 Importantly, many of these are 
industries have had long and successful histories of labor organizing.45 
Finally, the AG Act would expand the definition of temporary labor to three 
years from the current ten months under the current program.46 This means that 
guest workers would be available for not just seasonal, but for year-round work. 
While this would introduce a level of stability to the labor force in the food 
industries, it also would expand the number of workers in the labor force who 
are subject to severe restrictions on bargaining for better working conditions.47  
Most importantly, the bill would place legal restrictions on the employment 
relationship that would necessarily create more vulnerable workers. First, the H-
2C program would not require employers to provide free transportation and 
housing for workers, as the current program requires.48 Second, under the H-2C 
program, wages would be calculated as a function of the minimum wage, rather 
 
 40. H.R. 4092 § 3(d). 
 41. Philip Martin, The H-2A Farm Guestworker Program Is Expanding Rapidly: Here are the 
Numbers You Need to Know, ECON. POL’Y INST.: WORKING ECON. BLOG (Apr. 13, 2017, 5:54 
PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/h-2a-farm-guestworker-program-expanding-rapidly [https://perma. 
cc/P7DR-5ML7]. 
 42. Kate Cox, Why Today’s Vote on H-2C Visas Is Food’s Biggest Labor Battle, THE NEW 
FOOD ECON. (Oct. 4, 2017), https://newfoodeconomy.org/h2-c-visa-is-foods-biggest-labor-battle/ 
[https://perma.cc/TJQ8-LBCT]. 
 43. H.R. 4092 § 3(d). 
 44. Id. at § 2. 
 45. Dairy, TEAMSTERS, https://teamster.org/divisions/dairy [https://perma.cc/8BC3-B3S7] 
(last visited Aug. 31, 2018); Food Processing Division, TEAMSTERS, https://teamster.org/divi 
sions/food-processing [https://perma.cc/ZB2T-ZJQN?type=image] (last visited Aug. 31, 2018); 
About the USTFA, U.S. TROUT FARMERS ASS’N, https://ustfa.org/about-the-ustfa/ [https://perma. 
cc/5RXA-395Z] (last visited Aug. 31, 2018). 
 46. H.R. 4092 § 3(a). 
 47. See id. at § 4. 
 48. H.R. JUDICIARY COMM., 115TH CONG., THE AGRICULTURAL GUESTWORKER ACT OF 
2017, https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/102017-AG-Act-OnePager.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KU2W-R3HN]. 
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than the higher prevailing wage.49 Thus, the wages offered to H-2C workers 
might be lower than those currently offered to guest workers, by law. Guest 
workers under this program could make less than nine dollars per hour, 
compared to the over thirteen dollars per hour that dairy workers now earn.50 
Third, the legislation redefines at-will employment for guest workers by 
allowing the employer to terminate a worker, but not allowing a worker to quit 
a job without losing legal status.51 Fourth, under the proposed legislation, unlike 
workers in other immigration categories, an H-2C worker does not have the right 
to allow a spouse or children to accompany him or her.52 This condition also 
introduces a degree of vulnerability because it makes H-2C guest workers more 
socially and geographically isolated—and perhaps less likely to seek permanent 
workplace changes—than native-born workers. 
Finally, with respect to employee voice, the Act would limit the methods by 
which H-2C workers could complain or grieve their working conditions. First, 
the legislation would require that H-2C workers seek mediation before filing a 
civil action against an employer.53 Second, the legislation would make 
mandatory binding arbitration a condition of employment.54 Third, the statute 
would require workers to share the costs of mediation or arbitration of an 
employment-related dispute.55 A legislatively mandated arbitration procedure 
would effectively limit concerted activity, class actions, and freedom of contract 
for H-2C workers.  
The AG Act would also limit the federal benefits available to these workers. 
H-2C workers would not be eligible for earned income, child tax, or health care 
premium credits.56 More importantly, while H-2C workers would not be eligible 
for insurance under the Affordable Care Act, they would nonetheless be required 
to obtain their own health insurance as a condition of employment.57 And, and 
as a signal that these workers are not full members of the polity, employers 
would also withhold ten percent of a worker’s wages and deposit them into a 
fund only available in a U.S. embassy or consulate in the worker’s home country, 
as a way to guarantee that workers return home.58 Finally, while current H-2 
workers can use federally-funded legal services to bring workplace complaints, 
 
 49. H.R. 4092 § 3(a). 
 50. Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/ 
minimumwage (last visited Aug. 30, 2018); May 2017 National Industry-Specific Occupational 
Employment and Wage Estimates, OCCUPATIONAL EMP’T STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/oes/ 
current/naics4_311500.htm [https://perma.cc/D7YS-EK8H] (last visited Aug. 30, 2018). 
 51. H.R. 4092 § 3(b). 
 52. Id. at § 3(c). 
 53. Id. at § 4. 
 54. Id. at § 6. 
 55. Id. 
 56. H.R. 4092 § 7. 
 57. Id. at § 7(c). 
 58. Id. at § 3(a). 
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H-2C workers would be barred from using federal legal aid for filing complaints 
against employers.59 
The provisions of this proposed bill would regulate through the immigration 
statute the very terms and conditions of employment that Congress contemplated 
could be bargained for through contract or through concerted activity.60 By 
dictating terms and conditions for guest workers, and by limiting the avenues for 
grievance, the H-2C program would effectively institutionalize subpar 
conditions in the food industry. More importantly, the proposed restrictions on 
employee rights signal the terms and conditions employers desire for the future. 
The methods of control in the proposed legislation include control over work 
time; control over the terms of the contract, including the term of the contract 
and restrictions on moving to another employer; control over the treatment of 
the worker outside the workplace (in the form of benefits limitations); and 
intrusion on privacy and autonomy, to the extent the legislation disallows family 
unification.61  
B. How Guest Work Conditions Are Creeping into the Gig Economy 
These methods of control are emerging as well in the gig economy, albeit in 
refined and sophisticated forms. The proposed changes to guest work programs 
mirror the evolution of the gig economy from an infrastructure of jobs that last 
months, weeks, days or hours to jobs that last minutes or seconds. Amazon 
Mechanical Turk and CrowdFlower are examples of the business model. Both 
are algorithmic platforms that outsource work that computers cannot yet 
master—facial recognition, for example—to humans who can do the work in 
seconds or minutes and for pennies.62 The business model, as described by the 
Chief Executive Officer of CrowdFlower, sounds eerily similar to the rationale 
for establishing a guest worker program under immigration law:  
Before the Internet, it would be really difficult to find someone, sit them down 
for ten minutes and get them to work for you, and then fire them after those ten 
minutes. But with technology, you can actually find them, pay them the tiny 




 59. H.R. Judiciary Comm., 115th Cong., supra note 48. 
 60. See National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 61. See generally H.R. 4092. 
 62. Alana Semuels, The Internet is Enabling a New Kind of Poorly Paid Hell, THE ATLANTIC 
(Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/01/amazon-mechanical-turk/ 
551192/ [https://perma.cc/2RF9-6ZDB]. 
 63. Moshe Z. Marvit, How Crowdworkers Became the Ghosts in the Digital Machine, THE 
NATION (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-crowdworkers-became-ghosts-dig 
ital-machine [https://perma.cc/5QJP-EKXY]. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
128 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:119 
The comparisons do not end there. In the gig economy’s business model, 
workers are increasingly like commodities in the same ways that guest workers 
are increasingly expedient and fungible. Even though the forms of control are 
not legislated—as they are for guest workers—they are just as effective.  
In the guest work context, employers offer take-it-or-leave-it contracts, first 
to U.S. workers and, if none are available or willing, then to guest workers. 
Wages are set, as are other conditions of employment, such as the term of the 
contract, the benefits provided, and the conditions for termination of the 
contract. The hiring process for Amazon’s Mechanical Turk has been described 
in similar ways:  
Here’s how it works: the employers (called “Requesters”) can be actual humans 
or a computer program running a script that automatically outsources any task it 
cannot perform to the crowd. The Requesters place microtasks (called “Human 
Intelligence Tasks,” or HITs) on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website and offer 
non-negotiable contracts with a take-it-or-leave-it rate for each HIT. The 
Turkers (officially called “Providers”) perform only small microtasks over and 
over, rarely getting a glimpse of the whole.64 
Although guest workers are considered employees, many more immigrant 
workers—especially undocumented workers—work as independent 
contractors.65 As such, they cannot avail themselves of the protections of labor 
and employment laws. Gig workers face the same restrictions. The vast majority 
are considered independent contractors.66 The narrative of entrepreneurship is 
strong in the gig and platform sectors and platform providers sell themselves as 
marketplaces rather than employers.67 As one scholar noted, the business model 
in the platform economy is:  
to operate powerful software applications (apps) designed to match consumers 
who need a task done with entrepreneurs in search of their next ‘gig’. . . .  
  Upon closer inspection, however, it quickly emerges that many platforms 
offer much more than mere matchmaking services: they are in the business of 
digital work intermediation. To deliver tightly curated products and services to 
customers, gig-economy operators actively shape the entire transaction by 
means of close control over their workforce: from setting terms and conditions 
and checking relevant qualifications, to ensuring proper performance and 
payment.68 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Travis Putnam Hill, In Texas, Undocumented Immigrants Have No Shortage of Work, 
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Just as the terms and conditions of the contract control important aspects of 
a guest worker’s life, so do algorithms surrounding the ratings of gig workers 
who drive for Uber, dog-walk for Rover, or perform chores for TaskRabbit. The 
algorithms that companies use do not simply aggregate the preferences of 
customers and turn them into reputation ratings on a scale of one to five.69 
Algorithms monitor elements such as compliance with platform policies and 
how often and how quickly a worker responds to accepts new tasks.70 Uber, for 
example, exercises control not through direct company policy, but through 
strategies and algorithms that push drivers to take jobs even though they might 
be unprofitable, and through gaming behavioral strategies such as pop-ups 
encouraging drivers to continue driving when they signal they are ready to quit 
for the day.71 
Just as a guest worker is paid only for the services provided, and many times 
on a piece rate basis, the business model for the gig economy similarly requires 
that workers are paid only for the time they work. Gig workers are also 
responsible for the costs incident to their employment. Uber drivers, for 
example, must pay for their own gas, insurance and car costs.72 They must also 
self-fund their health insurance and other benefits typically available through 
work.73  
C. Challenging Work Arrangements at Both Ends of the Work Spectrum 
Several scholars and authors have noted that the work arrangements of gig 
workers are not that different from the types of workplace conditions of low-
skill workers in the brick-and-mortar economy.74 Work in both sectors of the 
economy has been broken down into smaller and smaller tasks, which draws in 
increasingly larger numbers of workers.75 Interestingly, the gig economy is 
drawing upon the same traditionally excluded groups that guest work programs 
draw from: immigrants.76 The innovation narrative hides the very risks that guest 
work employers seek to avoid to shift to workers, including labor shortages, 
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liability for employee benefits, and further regulation of the employment 
relationship.77  
While the comparisons between work conditions in guest work and gig work 
are striking, the comparison might also serve to reveal possible solutions to the 
instability created in both fields. Understanding the potential vulnerability that 
comes from an imbalance of power in the employment relationship, the federal 
government guaranteed a minimum wage for guest workers. Currently, it is tied 
to the prevailing wage in an industry, although the AG Act seeks to change it to 
the minimum wage.78 The AG Act would also guarantee a minimum amount of 
work.79 Because the same dynamic of instability exists in the gig economy, 
similar measures would allow for decreased vulnerability in that sector. These 
changes should occur at the federal labor and employment level so that those 
laws evolve with the changes in the economy. 
States, moreover, have begun to legislate protections for both immigrants 
and gig workers, recognizing the special vulnerabilities of these workers. For 
immigrant workers, California guarantees employment protections regardless of 
immigration status.80 Employers there cannot retaliate against employees 
seeking workplace protections by threatening deportation.81 Recently, the 
California legislature passed a law guaranteeing overtime wage protection to 
farmworkers—a category of employees not covered by the Fair Labor Standards 
Act and recognized as widely held by undocumented noncitizens in the state.82 
The goal of these laws is to remove incentives to hire vulnerable workers, either 
as employees or independent contractors. Seattle passed an ordinance increasing 
worker protections for transportation company drivers who were considered 
independent contractors, although the Ninth Circuit recently allowed challenge 
to the ordinance, filed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to proceed on 
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antitrust grounds.83 The holding demonstrates that efforts to rein in gig economy 
overreach must be coordinated at state and federal levels.  
The efforts of states also show the potential power of worker organization 
to bring balance to the operating rules in the gig economy. Much of this 
organizing will be done outside the confines of the National Labor Relations 
Act, which restricts what unions can do within the collective bargaining 
scheme.84 For now, it must also be done within the confines of anti-trust law, 
which restricts any form of collusion that might lead to price-fixing.85 There is 
an opportunity in this moment to consider strategies outside traditional labor 
organizing, in large part because the nature of employment is shifting. State and 
local organizing efforts can collaborate with state agencies, for example, to 
define employment in a way that includes gig workers. Gig workers, moreover, 
can file misclassification suits to achieve re-classification of their employment 
status. Finally, both federal and state law can legislate conditions in the gig 
economy, in much the same way that guest work regulation has developed the 
contours of guest work. Once we realize that the innovation narrative is not, in 
fact, innovative, we can start to build alliances across brick-and-mortar and 
virtual platform work to achieve leverage—and rights—for workers across the 
spectrum.  
*** 
Eric Posner and Glen Weyl recently floated a proposal that called for 
creating visas under a program they call the Visas Between Individuals 
Program.86 The program would allow individuals to sponsor immigrants, who 
would agree to work for the sponsor for an agreed upon wage and period of time, 
not to exceed three years.87 Sponsors could then hire out those immigrants, or 
pay them less than minimum wage to work directly for individuals to pay back 
the cost of the visa sponsorship.88 The idea would be that individuals in the 
United States would receive benefits that corporations and businesses currently 
receive under existing temporary work programs. The proposal, smacking of 
indentured servitude, would allow individuals to sponsor their own immigrants 
indefinitely to work on projects as individuals see fit.89 Essentially, sponsors 
would act as intermediaries, hiring out workers to employers looking for, much 
like labor contractors in guest worker programs, or like platform employers in 
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the platform economy claim to be.90 In the future of work that Posner and Weyl 
imagine, the humanity of the immigrant is erased. Jeremias Prassl warns that 
considering humans as cogs at the service of the platform economy puts us 
another step closer to the complete commodification of workers.91 This Article 
has emphasized the conditions of vulnerability that make for an easier transition 
to the work world that both Prassl and Posner and Weyl predict. Importantly, the 
dehumanization of workers is much easier if they are hired for shorter and 
shorter periods of time. This is what makes the parallel between the guest worker 
program’s evolution and the platform economy so apt. In both worlds, workers 
are seen as a piece of the production process that must be managed. In the case 
of guest workers and increasingly, immigrants in the gig economy, that they are 
foreign-born might facilitate the dehumanization process. The role of 
government requires that we re-humanize work, by recognizing that all workers, 
including short-term employees or independent contractors, deserve protections 
in the workplace no matter how short their gigs might be. 
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